Ancient Hermeneutics in Modern Law: Application of Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation in the Indian Judiciary

Abstract

This article undertakes a systematic examination of the Mīmāṁsā rules of textual interpretation— traditionally rooted in ancient Vedic exegesis, with their demonstrable application within the jurisprudence of the Indian judiciary, particularly, the Apex Court of India. The Purva Mīmāṁsā school, systematised by Jaimini and elaborated by Sabara, Kumarila Bhatta, and Prabhakara Misra, developed a sophisticated and internally coherent set of hermeneutic principles designed to resolve ambiguity, conflict, and lacunae in normative texts. These principles—including shruti (direct statement), linga (contextual indication), vaakya (sentential unity), prakarana (contextual determination), sthaan (positional significance), sanakhya (nominal determination), arthaikatvat (unity of purpose), badha (sublation), and atidesa (extension by analogy)—represent a contribution to interpretive theory of enduring significance. Through a close reading of landmark constitutional and statutory decisions, this article demonstrates that Indian courts have—whether consciously or by cultural inheritance—applied the Mīmāṁsā interpretive logic in their adjudicative methodology. The article further situates this tradition comparatively within Western hermeneutic theory (Gadamer, Dworkin, Hart) and modern statutory interpretation scholarship, arguing that Mīmāṁsā offers not merely historical curiosity but an intellectually rigorous alternative — and sometimes, superior framework for legal reasoning in a pluralist, post-colonial constitutional democracy.